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[L. A. No. 22028. In Bank. Aug. 13, 1952.] 
GEORGE E. CARY et al., Respondents, v. LAWRENCE 
WENTZEL, Appellant. 
[1] New Trial-Award as to Part of Issues.-An order granting 
a new trial limited to the damages issue will be reversed 
when it is shown on appeal that the damages awarded by the 
jury are inadequate, the issue of liability is close, and other 
circumstances indicate that the verdict was probably the re-
sult of prejudice, sympathy or an improper compromise. 
(2] !d.-Award as to Part of Issues.-An order granting plaintiffs' 
motion for a new trial on the single issue of damages in an 
automobile collision case was reversed where the amount al-
lowed for special damages did not include cost of hospitaliza-
tion and future dental work, and an award of $296 as general 
damages was inadequate to compensate plaintiff wife, who 
was still bedridden a year and a half after the accident and 
was continuing to suffer pain; where the evidence was con-
flicting as to whether defendant or a third person driving an-
other automobile involved in the collision was driving on the 
wrong side of the road; and where other circumstances, in-
cluding an inconsistent verdict against the heirs of a guest 
riding in the third automobile, indicated that the verdict 
against defendant in this case was the result of an improper 
compromise. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Luis Obispo and from an order granting a new trial. Ray 
B. Lyon, Judge. Reversed. 
Action for damages arising out of a collision of vehicles. 
Order limiting new trial to issue of damages, reversed. 
A. H. Brazil for Appellant. 
Kenneth J. Thayer and Dorsett M. Phillips for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-At about 4 o'clock on the afternoon of 
December 26, 1948, plaintiffs George and Mabel Cary, hus-
band and wife, were proceeding west on Highway 41 approxi-
mately 10 miles east of Paso Robles. Mr. Cary was driving. 
The pavement at that point was 14 feet wide and had a center 
[1] See Cal.Jur., New Trial, § 16; Am.Jur., New Trial, § 21. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] New Trial, § 15.1. 
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line that separated the highway into two lanes, for traffic in 
each direction. The sky was overcast and it was drizzling. 
For several miles they had been following, at a distance of 
about 100 feet, an automobile owned and being driven by 
defendant, Lawrence Wentzel. Defendant's wife and child 
were riding with him. Both cars were traveling approximately 
35 miles per hour. A third automobile was being driven in 
the opposite direction by Robert Seelinger, with whom Mrs. 
Dora Grove was riding as a guest. Defendant's and Seelin-
ger's cars collided, and Seelinger's car swerved in front of 
and collided with plaintiffs' car. Mrs. Grove died several 
days later as a result of injuries received in the accident. 
Plaintiffs and Seelinger were injured, and their cars were 
damaged. 
It is conceded that plaintiffs were not guilty of contributory 
negligence. The principal issue at the trial was whether de-
fendant or Seelinger was responsible for the first collision. 
Three witnesses (plaintiffs and Seelinger) testified that de-
fendant's car was being driven partly on the wrong side of 
the center line; two witnesses (defendant and his wife) testi-
fied that Seelinger suddenly crossed the center line into their 
path. 
Defendant was sued by Seeling·er, by the heirs of Mrs. 
Grove, and by the Carys, and the three suits were consolidated 
for trial. The jury found for defendant in the Seelinger and 
Grove actions and returned a verdict for plaintiffs in the 
amount of $1,000 in the Cary action. Seelinger did not move 
for a new trial and did not appeal; the judgment against him 
is now final. Mrs. Grove's heirs were granted a new trial, 
but they later voluntarily dismissed their action. In the Cary 
case, defendant's motion for a new trial was denied, and 
plaintiffs' motion for a new trial on the issue of damages 
only was granted. Defendant has appealed from the order 
granting a limited new trial and from the judgment. He 
contends that the jury did not actually determine that he 
was negligent and that the verdict against him was the re-
sult of sympathy or an improper compromise. He therefore 
seeks a new trial on all issues. 
The principles that govern the granting of new trials limited 
to the damages. issue were reviewed in Leipert v. Honold, 
ante, p. 462 [247 P.2d 324]. We there pointed out that 
the question is addressed in the first instance to the sound 
discretion of the trial court. [1] An order granting such 
a limited new trial will be reversed, however, when it is 
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shown on appeal that the damages awarded by the jury are 
inadequate, the issue of liability is close, and other circum-
stances indicate that the verdict was probably the result of 
prejudice, sympathy, or an improper compromise. 
[2] (1) Inadequacy of damages. Defendant contends that 
the $1,000 verdict was less than the undisputed special dam-
ages and therefore could not have resulted from a decision 
by the jury that defendant was negligent. (See Wallace v. 
Miller, 26 Cal.App.2d 55, 56 [78 P.2d 745); McNear v. Pacific 
Greyhound Lines, 63 Cal.App.2d 11, 16 (146 P.2d 34].) The 
amount of plaintiffs' special damages, however, is disputed. 
Defendant contends that the special damages shown totaled 
$1,199. * Plaintiffs contend that only $704 special damages 
were proved, so that the verdict allowed $296 for general 
damages. The difference between these two versions of the 
special damages results from defendant's inclusion of $175 
for hospital bills and $320 for future dental work. Plain-
tiffs suggest that the jury may have disallowed the hospital 
expenses because they related to services that were rendered 
to Mrs. Cary by Army hospitals and for which Mr. Cary, 
as a soldier, would not be liable. There was no evidence, 
however, that would justify such action. The Carys testified 
that bills from the Army had been received. They agreed on 
the length of time she had been hospitalized (three and a 
half months) and on the amount they were charged ($1.75 
per day). At no time during the trial was this expense dis-
puted. We cannot assume that the jurors, without evidence 
to support them, speculated concerning the nature and ex-
tent of free hospital service given by the Government to wives 
of servicemen. If they had concluded that defendant was 
negligent, they would certainly have awarded plaintiffs the 
cost of this hospitalization. The expense of future dental 
work could not, of course, be definitely determined at the 
time of trial. There can be no doubt, however, that such 
work had been made necessary by the accident, for three 
of Mrs. Cary's teeth had been broken and had had to be 
extracted and others had been cracked and loosened. The 
only evidence concerning the reasonable value of the needed 
bridgework was the testimony of Mrs. Cary that her dentist 
had estimated the expense at $320. In view of the undis-
puted injuries to her teeth, this estimate was not excessive. 
*The figure claimed by defendant is actually $1,219, but it is ap-
parent that an inadvertent error of $20 has been made. 
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(Cf. Keogh v. Maulding, 52 Cal.App.2d 17, 18, 21 [125 P.2d 
858].) 
It must be concluded that there was no legitimate reason 
that would have prompted the jury to exclude the cost of 
hospitalization and future bridgework from the special dam-
ages necessarily to be allowed in the event defendant were 
found liable. It follows that defendant is correct in his 
claim that the verdict for special damages should have been 
$1,199. The failure to award this minimum amount is a 
convincing indication that the jury had not reached the con-
clusion that defendant was negligent. 
Moreover, the jury should have allowed general damages 
for plaintiffs' suffering, inconvenience, and loss of time. Mrs. 
Cary was seriously injured. She was thrown into the wind-
shield, radio, and heater of their car and sustained lacerations 
on her forehead, chin, tongue, the inside of her mouth, and 
her left knee. In addition there were the broken and loosened 
teeth already mentioned, and bruises on her chest, shoulders, 
back, and legs. The cut on her chin left a scar. At the 
time of the trial, almost a year and a half after the acci-
dent, she was still bedridden and continued to suffer pain in 
her back and knee. A number of abscesses on her back de-
veloped and persisted to the time of trial; it is possible, how-
ever, that the jury concluded that these were related to an 
earlier disease ("valley fever") from which she had been 
suffering. Whatever may have been the cause of her con-
tinued general disability, it is clear that the injuries received 
in the accident were painful, extensive, and, in part at least, 
permanent. Mr. Cary was also injured, but had substantially 
recovered at the time of the trial. He was thrown against 
the steering wheel, bending it six inches, and he sustained 
bruises and cuts on his head, chest, and knee. 
The failure of the jury to allow substantial general dam-
ages for these injuries as well as for several weeks' loss of 
use of the automobile during repairs, also indicates that the 
liability issue had not been decided. 
(2) Evidence of liability. The jury had only the testi-
mony of the parties themselves from which to determine 
whether defendant or Seelinger was driving on the wrong side 
of the road. Seelinger and plaintiffs testified that defendant 
was at fault; defendant and his wife testified that Seelinger 
was at fault. It is apparent that the jury's task with re-
spect to this issue was exceptionally difficult. 
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It is also significant that the testimony of Seelinger and 
plaintiffs was to a certain extent inconsistent. Seelinger testi-
fied that as his car approached defendant's car, he saw de-
fendant's left wheels a foot or two over the center line for 
a distance of 100 to 200 feet before the accident. Plaintiffs 
testified, however, that defendant crossed over the line only 
a short time before the accident and that at the time of the 
collision defendant's car was still traveling at an angle from 
the center line of about 25 degrees. Mr. Cary admitted in 
his testimony, moreover, that he did not state to the officers 
i11vestigating the accident that defendant had driven on the 
wrong side of the highway. 
(3) Other circumstances indicating compromise. The ver-
dict against Seelinger is not inconsistent with the verdict in 
favor of plaintiffs, for the jury could have concluded that 
defendant was negligent and that Seelinger was guilty of 
contributory negligence. The court's instructions, however, 
limited the issue of contributory negligence to the Seelinger 
suit; Mrs. Grove was a guest in Seelinger's car and his negli-
gence would not be imputed to her. (Reynolds v. Firomeo, 
38 Cal.2d 5, 9-10 [236 P.2d 801].) The verdict against Mrs. 
Grove's heirs is therefore at variance with the verdict against 
defendant in the Cary action-the latter necessarily implies 
that defendant was negligent whereas the former implies that 
he was not. One of these verdicts is erroneous, and the gross 
inadequacy of the award in the Cary case suggests at once 
where the error lies. 
It is contended that the court's failure to give a damages 
instruction in the Grove case was responsible for the verdict 
against Mrs. Grove's heirs. This explanation is not per-
suasive. Special damages covering hospital and funeral ex-
penses were proved by the executor of Mrs. Grove's estate 
and were at no time disputed by defendant; that much at 
least would have been allowed by the jury. Moreover, dur-
ing their deliberations the jurors returned to the courtroom 
for instructions on questions that were causing difficulty. 
They would probably have sought similar aid from the court 
with regard to the measure o:f damages had they reached 
that issue and had difficulty in determining it. 
We have concluded that the verdict against defendant in 
the Cary action was the result of a compromise between jurors 
who believed that defendant should pay substantial damages 
and jurors who believed that he should pay none. There 
has not been, therefore, an acceptable determination of de-
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fendant 's liability, and defendant is entitled to a new trial 
on that issue. 
The judgment and order appealed from are reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
Schauer, J., concurred in the judgment. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The views which I have expressed in my dissenting opinion 
in Leipert v. Honold, ante, p. 462 [247 P.2d 324], this day 
filed, are equally applicable to this case. 
I would, therefore, affirm the order granting a new trial 
on the issue of damages only. 
[Crim. No. 5305. In Bank. Aug. 26, 1952.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. WILLIAM EDWARD 
COOK, Appellant. 
[1] Criminal Law-Proceeding on Issue of Insanity-Rights of 
Accused.-A defendant accused of murder is not denied due 
process of law and his right to be confronted with witnesses 
is not abridged by the fact that alienists appointed by the 
trial court met, prior to hearing on his plea of not guilty 
by reason of insanity, at a place designated by the district 
attorney, to examine grand jury and other transcripts, inter-
view witnesses who had observed defendant's conduct, in-
quire into his background and his behavior before and after 
the homicide, and examine defendant for the purpose of de-
termining his sanity, where the district attorney's office was 
not informed of the doctors' findings before they took the 
witness stand, defendant was not prevented from examining 
any witnesses interviewed by the alienists nor denied access 
to any documents which they considered, he was afforded full 
opportunity to cross-examine the doctors as to the basis for 
their opinions, and no objection was made to their testimony. 
[1] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1943 Rev.), Criminal Law, § 270. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 235; [2] Criminal 
Law, §1064; [3] Criminal Law, §1072; [4] Criminal Law, 
§ 1404(12); [5] Criminal Law, § 235(4); [6] Homicide, § 243. 
